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Abstract 
This paper traces the progressive shift at the international level from purely voluntary 
approaches (corporate social responsibility or CSR) towards accountability mechanisms to 
ensure the environmentally sound conduct of private entities. It examines whether the most 
recent international discussion on human rights and corporate accountability have adequately 
considered environmental protection concerns. It then concentrates on the growing number of 
international oversight mechanisms that provide a readily-available and impartial avenue for 
addressing complaints against private companies for their negative environmental impacts. 
The paper concludes that certain key standards elaborated within the framework of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, in particular environmental-cultural impact assessments 
and benefit-sharing, are increasingly referred to in the decisions of different international 
corporate accountability mechanisms to ensure both the protection of the environment and of 
human rights. 
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From Corporate Social Responsibility to Accountability Mechanisms 
 
ELISA MORGERA 
 
Introduction 
 
The international community has debated the need for international regulation and oversight 
of multinational companies for almost forty years.
1
 While States have hitherto resisted the 
creation of an international legally binding instrument on the matter, voluntary
2
 and soft-law
3
 
international instruments and initiatives of inter-governmental and multi-stakeholder origin 
have proliferated to support and encourage an environmentally sound conduct of 
multinational and other companies. This chapter seeks to trace the evolution of such 
international practice with a view to highlighting a progressive shift from purely voluntary 
approaches (corporate social responsibility or CSR
4
) towards accountability mechanisms. To 
this end, the chapter will first briefly discuss the increasing convergence in the definition of 
international environmental standards for corporate accountability operated by a variety of 
international organisations and processes (12.1.).
5
 It will then focus on the most recent 
discussion on human rights and corporate accountability, with a view to determining whether 
environmental protection concerns are adequately taken into account (12.2.). Attention will 
then concentrate on the growing number of international oversight and dispute avoidance 
mechanisms that provide a readily-available and impartial avenue for addressing individuals’, 
communities’ and civil society groups’ complaints against private companies and the 
possibility for an international entity to operate on the ground for fact-finding and/or 
mediation purposes (12.3).  
                                                 
1
  Early attempts were undertaken in the context of the UN Economic and Social Council that adopted a 
resolution in 1972 acknowledging the lack of an international regulatory framework for multinational 
corporations and the need to institutionalise international debate on that issue: ECOSOC Res. 1721 (LIII) 28 
July 1972. 
2
  This is notably the case of international public-private partnerships, which were endorsed as an official 
outcome of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002. See C. Streck, ‘The World Summit on 
Sustainable Development: Partnerships as the New Tool in Environmental Governance’ (2003) 13 Yearbook 
of International Environmental Law 21; E. Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International 
Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) ch. 12; B. Richardson’s contribution in this 
volume (below chapter 14). 
3
  This is the case of international standards on corporate environmental accountability elaborated in the 
context of international organisations, which will be discussed in detail in section 2 below. 
4
  CSR is the label used to group efforts and initiatives that are purposely voluntary in their approach to 
sustainable corporate conduct. Even voluntary initiatives may have, however, legal implications or 
relevance. See D. McBarnet, A. Voiculescu, T. Campbell (eds.), The New Corporate Accountability: 
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
5
  A more extensive treatment of this subject can be found in Morgera, above n 2, chs. 4-8. 
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 In concluding, this contribution aims to bring to light an under-studied aspect of the 
proliferation of relevant international initiatives. An argument will be put forward that the 
risk of fragmentation of international guidance on corporate accountability due to the 
multiplicity of different international accountability processes now in existence is 
significantly mitigated by the convergence of the standards used to guide and assess private 
companies’ conduct. Previous research of mine had indicated that international standard-
setting initiatives were increasingly characterised by a significant degree of convergence.
6
 In 
the early 2010s, this trend - as discussed in this contribution - has nothing but accelerated. 
The complementary finding of the present study is that the outcomes of international 
monitoring activities, which are equally carried out by a plethora of different international 
actors, also show increasing signs of convergence and cross-fertilization. Notably, the 
environmental standards elaborated within the framework of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, in particular environmental-cultural impact assessments and benefit-sharing, are 
referred to in the decisions of different international corporate accountability mechanisms. 
This is a significant contribution to ensuring substantive unity
7
 across different areas of 
international law, notably on the environment and on human rights, that may be negatively 
affected by the conduct of private operators (12.4). 
1.1 From CSR to corporate accountability through converging substantive 
environmental standards  
The term ‘corporate accountability’ was endorsed by the international community at the 2002 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD),
8
 and can be understood as a the 
legitimate expectation that reasonable efforts will be put in place, according to international 
standards, by private companies and foreign investors for the protection of a certain global 
interest or the attainment of a certain internationally agreed environmental objective.
9
 The 
expectations and relevant international standards that make up corporate accountability in 
international environmental law have been gradually spelt out through various international 
processes, some of which pre-dated or ran in parallel with the WSSD. These processes are 
characterised by different approaches (regulation vs collaboration), nature (inter-
governmental vs multi-stakeholder), and legal status (hard vs soft law). Nonetheless, upon 
                                                 
6
    Morgera, above n 2. 
7
  P-M. Dupuy, L'unité de l'ordre juridique international (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003). 
8
  Paragraph 49 of the WSSD Plan of Implementation, UN. Doc. A/CONF.199/20, Resolution 2, Annex, 4 
September 2002. 
9
  Morgera, above n 2, ch. 2. 
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closer inspection, they all build upon the same international standards for corporate 
environmental accountability. 
These instruments include the ill-fated UN draft Code of Conduct for Transnational 
Corporations,
10
 whose negotiations collapsed in the early 1990s,
11
 and the UN Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regards 
to Human Rights,
12
 which were adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights
13
 (a body comprising independent human rights experts acting in 
their personal capacity) but not by the former UN Commission on Human Rights.
14
 The UN 
Norms thus reached a level of expert legitimacy, but no political legitimisation.
15
 Relevant 
instruments also include the intergovernmentally approved OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Corporations,
16
 the partnership-focused principles of the UN Global Compact
17
 
(an initiative of the UN-Secretary General with support from various UN bodies)
18
 and the 
Performance Standards of the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC).19 The 
                                                 
10
  The draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, UN Doc. E/1990/94, 12 June 1990 (‘UN Draft 
Code’). 
11
  W. Sprote, ‘Negotiations on a United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations’ (1990) 33 
German Yearbook of International Law 331, at 339. 
12
  Commentary to the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with regards to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 26 August 2003 
(‘Commentary UN Norms’) 
13
  See ‘Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to 
human rights’ (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 26 August 2003) 
14
  The Commission did not adopt, but only ‘took note’ of the ‘Norms’ stating that they had ‘not been requested 
by the Commission and, as a draft proposal, had no legal standing, and that the Sub-Commission should not 
perform any monitoring function in this regard.’ Commission’s decision 2004/116: The responsibilities of 
transnational corporations and related business enterprises with regard to human rights 
(E/CN.4/DEC/2004/116, 20 April 2004), paragraph C. 
15
  See Simon Walker’s contribution in: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, ‘Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Development: Towards a New Agenda: Summaries of Presentations made at the 
UNRISD’ Conference (Geneva, 17-18 November 2003), at 85. 
16
  OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD,  2011) (‘OECD Guidelines’) 
17
    The website of the Global Compact can be found at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/Default.asp. 
See also United Nations Guide to the Global Compact: A Practical Understanding of the Vision and the Nine 
Principles, at 58, found at 
www.unglobalcompact.org/irj/servlet/prt/portal/prtroot/com.sapportals.km.docs/ungc_html_content/Public_
Documents/gcguide.pdf 
18
  In time, the Global Compact received an intergovernmental endorsement through General Assembly 
resolutions 62/211 ‘Towards Global Partnership’ (2007) para. 9 and 64/223 ‘Towards Global Partnership’ 
(2009) para. 13. The question of the intergovernmentally agreed mandate of the Global Compact remains 
open, however. See the Joint Inspection Unit, United Nations Corporate Partnerships: The role and 
functioning of the Global Compact, UN Doc. JIU/REP/2010/9 (2010), para. 13-18 and recommendation 1; 
and ‘A response from the Global Compact Office’ 24 March 2011, at 2. 
19
  IFC, Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability, adopted by the IFC Board on 21 
February 2006 (‘2006 IFC Performance Standards’). A revised version was adopted in 2011 and is discussed 
below: 2012 IFC Performance Standards, available at: 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/policyreview.nsf/Content/2012-Edition#PerformanceStandards. See IFC press 
release, ‘IFC updates Environmental and Social Standards, strengthening commitment to sustainability and 
transparency’ 12 May 2011. 
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latter in particular includes environmental standards clearly identifying the responsibility of 
the private sector on the basis of international environmental agreements,
20
 and have been 
widely followed by regional development banks as well as major commercial banks.
21
 
A series of common standards have emerged from these initiatives that appear to have 
reached a significant level of detail and acceptance at the international level as directly 
applicable to private companies. They include the environmental impact self-assessment, 
namely the ongoing assessment, beyond legal requirements at the national level, of the 
possible environmental impacts of private companies’ activities before and during their 
operations, on the basis of scientific evidence, as well as communication with likely-to-be-
affected communities.
22
 On the basis of such continuous assessment, private companies are 
further to elaborate environmental management systems (EMS) to assist in controlling direct 
and indirect impacts on the environment and possibly to continually improve their 
environmental performance.
23
 In accordance with their environmental impact assessments 
and management systems, private companies are further expected to reasonably take active 
steps, including the suspension of certain activities, to prevent or minimise an environmental 
damage, particularly in case of likely transboundary environmental harm or environmental 
harm with serious human rights consequences.
24
 In addition, in the face of scientific 
uncertainty, private companies are further expected to undertake precautionary action by 
taking the most cost-effective early action to prevent the occurrence of environmental harm, 
or by avoiding delays in minimising such harm.
25
 Disclosure of public information,
26
 direct 
                                                 
20
  For a more in-depth discussion, see Morgera, above n 2, ch 7. Note that the IFC provides both direct and 
indirect investments: in the latter case, the Performance Standards apply to financial intermediaries rather 
than to private companies carrying out projects in developing countries. See B.J. Richardson, ‘Financing 
Sustainability: The New Transnational Governance of Socially Responsible Investment’ (2008) 17 
Yearbook of International Environmental Law 73. 
21
  D. Ong, ‘From ‘International’ to ‘Transnational’ Environmental Law? A Legal Assessment of the 
Contribution of the ‘Equator Principles’ to International Environmental Law’ (2010) 79 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 35–74; C. Wright, ‘Setting Standards for Responsible Banking: Examining the Role of the 
International Finance Corporation in the Emergence of the Equator Principles’, in F. Biermann, B. 
Siebenhüner and A. Schreyrögg (eds.), International Organisations in Global Environmental Governance 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009) 51–70. 
22
  Commentary UN Norms, above n 12, at (b) and (c); OECD Guidelines, above n 16, chapter VI, para 3; 2006 
IFC Performance Standards, above n 19, para. 4-6 (cf. 2012 IFC Performance Standards 1, above n 19, para 
5-7). 
23
  OECD Guidelines, above n 16, chapter VI, para. 1 and Commentary, para. 60; Commentary UN Norms, 
above n 12, section (g); 2006 IFC Performance Standards, above n 19, para. 16 and 23 (cf. 2012 IFC 
Performance Standard 1, above n 19, para 17 and 24). 
24
  OECD Guidelines, above n 16, chapter VI, para 5; 2006 IFC Performance Standard 3, above n 19 (cf. 2012 
IFC Performance Standard 3); implicitly, Principle 10 of the Global Compact (Guide to the Global Compact, 
above n. 17, at 64); Commentary UN Norms, above n 12, at (e)-(g). 
25
  The Global Compact, Principle 7 and Guide to the Global Compact, above n. 17, at 54; OECD Guidelines, 
above n 16, chapter VI, para. 4; UN Norms, above n 13, section G. 
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consultations with the public,
27
 and the creation of a review or appeal process for 
communities to express their complaints,
28
are complementary and mutually reinforcing 
procedural standards. What has been more difficult to determine is a substantive standard for 
corporate environmental accountability: only the IFC standards attempted to identify such a 
standard as the sustainable natural resource management
29
 and respect for internationally 
protected sites.
30
  
Such convergence on international standard-setting became even more visible in 2011, 
when both the OECD Guidelines and the IFC Standards were revised  in order to, inter alia, 
take into account the development of the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights 
(discussed below). The review brought about further convergence in the procedural standards 
for corporate environmental accountability and new developments in terms of substantive 
standards, in particular linked to biodiversity and climate change.  
On the procedural side, the 2011 review of the OECD Guidelines stressed stakeholder 
engagement as an interactive and two-way process based on good faith for the planning and 
decision-making concerning projects or activities ‘that may significantly impact local 
communities’ such as those involving the intensive use of land and water, as well as 
disclosure of climate change and biodiversity-specific information.
31
 In addition, it included 
references to due diligence, reflecting the key concept underpinning the UN Framework on 
Business and Human Rights. These recent revisions, however, have been criticised by civil 
society for their lack of explicit reference to prior informed consent in the consultations with 
indigenous peoples, lack of indications on what constitutes an adequate impact assessment 
                                                                                                                                                       
26
  UN Draft Code, above n 10, para 42; United Nations Guide to the Global Compact, above n 17, at 58; UN 
Norms, above n 13, (b) and (c); 2006 IFC Performance Standard 3, above n 19, para 19 (cf 2012 IFC 
Performance Standard 1, above n 19, para 29); OECD Guidelines, above n 16, chapter VI, para 2. 
27
  Guide to the Global Compact, above n 16, at 58; OECD Guidelines, above n 16, chapter VI, para 2; 2006 
IFC Performance Standard 3, above n 19, para 19 and 23 (cf 2012 IFC Performance Standards 1, para 30-
33); 6, para 12; 7, objectives and para 9; and 8, para 6, all above n 19. 
28
  2006 IFC Performance Standard 3, above n 19, para 16 and 23 (cf 2012 IFC Performance Standard 1, above 
n 19, para 35). 
29
  2006 IFC Performance Standards 1, above n. 19, fn 7 made reference to ‘sustainable resource management’ 
as ‘the use, development and protection of resources in a way or at a rate that enables people and 
communities to provide for their present social, economic and cultural well-being while also sustaining the 
potential of those resources to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations’ (cf. 2012 IFC 
Performance Standard 6, above n 19). 
30
  2006 IFC Performance Standards 6, above n. 19. For a more detailed discussion on these substantive 
standards, see Morgera, above n 2, ch 8. 
31
  OECD Council, ‘OECD Council, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises : Update 2011 – Note by 
the Secretary-General’, OECD doc. C(2011)59 (3 May 2011), Appendix II, para II. A.14; OECD Council, 
‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises : Update 2011 – Commentaries’, OECD Doc. C(2011) 
59/ADD1, 3 May 2011, paras. 25 and 33. 
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process, the lack of a requirement for environmental disclosure requirements, and lack of 
consideration for cumulative environmental impacts.
32
  
The concomitant 2011 review of the IFC Performance Standards went along similar 
lines, being equally influenced by the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights.
33
 As 
opposed to the OECD Guidelines review, however, the IFC significantly strengthened its 
approach to community consultations, linking the need for companies to conduct ‘informed 
consultation’ with a specific and express  (albeit qualified) requirement for prior informed 
consent. IFC clients are thus to ‘consider’ involving representatives of affected communities 
in monitoring the effectiveness of their environmental management programs only ‘where 
appropriate,’34 thus leaving a considerable margin of discretion to individual business 
entities. This is coupled with the creation of an ‘external communications system’ that will 
allow IFC clients to screen, assess and reply to communications from stakeholders with a 
view to continually improving their management system.  The system is in turn subject to the 
requirement for a ‘stakeholder engagement framework’ in the case that the exact location of 
the project is unknown but the project is nonetheless reasonably expected to have significant 
impacts on local communities. More detailed indications regarding dissemination of 
information are provided when communities may be affected by risks of adverse impacts of 
the project, with the significant specification that when stakeholder consultations are the 
responsibility of the host government, the client is expected to conduct a complementary 
process if the government-led engagement does not meet the IFC Performance Standards.
35
  
Prior informed consent specifically needs to be obtained from IFC clients in three cases: 
potential relocation of indigenous peoples, impacts on lands and natural resources subject to 
traditional ownership or under customary use and projects proposing to use cultural resources 
for commercial purposes.
36
 The IFC has also engaged in ‘translating’ the concept of prior 
                                                 
32
  OECDWatch statement on the update of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Improved 
content and scope, but procedural shortcomings remain (25 May 2011); and Amnesty International, The 
2010-11 Update of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises has come to an end: the OECD must 
now turn into effective implementation’ (23 May 2011). 
33
 Note that the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights that elaborated the UN Framework 
participated in both reviews: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises: Further steps toward the 
operationalization of the “protect, respect and remedy” framework (2010) UN Doc A/HRC/14/27, para. 13. 
34
  2012 IFC Performance Standard 1, ‘Assessment and Management of Social and Environmental Risks and 
Impacts’, above n 19, para 21. 
35
  2012 IFC Performance Standard 1, above n 19, paras. 26 and 30-31 and 38. Information to be disseminated 
to affected communities include: purpose, nature and scale of the project; duration of proposed project 
activities; risks and potential impacts on communities and relevant elements of the management programme; 
envisaged stakeholder engagement process; and grievance and redress mechanism.  
36
  2012 IFC Performance Standard 1, above n 19, para 35, where it is explicitly mentioned that ‘consent does 
not necessarily require unanimity and may be achieved even when individuals and sub-groups explicitly 
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informed consent for private companies: according to the Performance Standard on 
indigenous peoples, prior informed consent is a good-faith negotiation with culturally-
appropriate institutions representing indigenous peoples’ communities, with a view to 
reaching an agreement that is seen as legitimate by the majority within the community.
37
 In 
addition, private companies are called upon to put in place mitigation measures, such as 
compensation and benefit-sharing taking into account indigenous peoples’ laws, institutions 
and customs, and to ensure that distribution of benefits be individually or collectively based 
or a combination of both. Benefits may include, according to the preferences of indigenous 
peoples, culturally-appropriate improvement of their standard of living and livelihoods and 
the long-term sustainability of the natural resources on which they depend.
38
 Benefit-sharing 
is further envisaged where the business entity ‘intends to utilise natural resources that are 
central to the identity and livelihoods of indigenous peoples and their use exacerbates 
livelihood risk.
39
 With specific regard to involuntary resettlement, IFC clients are expected, 
according to one of the 2011 amendments, to implement measures to ensure, for communities 
with natural resource-based livelihoods, the continued access to affected resources or 
alternative resources with equivalent livelihood-earning potential and accessibility. In 
alternative, IFC clients are to provide compensation and benefits associated with the natural 
resource use that ‘may be collective in nature rather than directly oriented towards 
individuals and households’, taking into account the ecological context.40 Significantly, the 
2011 IFC review relied on the legal concept of benefit-sharing, as a key link between prior 
informed consent and due diligence.
41
 
Notably, the 2011 reviews also expanded on substantive standards of corporate 
environmental accountability. The 2011 review of the OECD Guidelines addressed a new 
recommendation on ‘exploring and assessing ways to improve environmental performance’ 
with reference to emission reduction, efficient resource use, the management of toxic 
                                                                                                                                                       
disagree’. Compare with the understanding of prior informed consent proposed by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on indigenous peoples’ rights (discussed below), who clarified that prior informed consent does 
not provide indigenous people with a veto power when the State acts legitimately and faithfully in the public 
interest, but rather “establishes the need to frame consultation procedures in order to make every effort to 
build consensus on the part of all concerned” and that consensus-driven consultation processes should not 
only address measures to mitigate or compensate for adverse impacts of projects, but also explore and arrive 
at means of equitable benefit-sharing in a spirit of true partnership (Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34 (2009), 
para 48 and 53). 
37
  2012 IFC Performance Standard 7: Indigenous Peoples, above n 19, para 15. 
38
  Ibid., para. 12-13. 
39
  Ibid., para 18. 
40
  2012 IFC Performance Standard 5: Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement, above n 19, para 26. 
41
 In the previous version of the IFC Performance Standards the concept of benefit-sharing was only relied upon 
in the context of cultural heritage: 2006 IFC Performance Standard 8, above n 19. 
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substances and the conservation of biodiversity.
42
 Regrettably, this significant addition is not 
addressed in the commentary to the Guidelines. The concomitant 2011 review of the IFC 
Performance Standards focused more extensively on climate change, resource efficiency and 
biodiversity. The IFC Policy on Social and Environmental Standards, which targets the IFC 
itself, acknowledged the need to support the private sector’s contribution to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, building the capacity of the private sector in relation to climate 
change, biodiversity and resource efficiency, as well as to limit its impacts on ecosystem 
services,
43
 and to reflect a human rights due diligence approach across its sustainability 
principles.
44
 In the Performance Standards addressed to private companies, the IFC then 
introduced very detailed standards on climate change, including that the client implements 
‘technical and financially feasible and cost-effective options to reduce project-related 
greenhouse gas emissions during the design and operation of the project’, as well as more 
specific obligations in case of projects expected or actually producing more than 25,000 
tonnes of carbon-dioxide equivalent annually.
45
 Resource efficiency also includes specific 
standards to reduce potentially significant water consumption and waste reduction, including 
checking whether contractors for the disposal of hazardous waste are reputable and 
legitimately licensed and their sites are operated in a manner consistent with acceptable 
standards. IFC clients are also to consider whether they should develop their own recovery or 
disposal facilities at the project site. They are further subject to the prohibition to purchase, 
store, manufacture, use or trade in products classified as extremely hazardous or highly 
hazardous by the World Health Organisation.
46
  
On biodiversity, the IFC Standards concerning natural habitats have been strengthened 
by making reference to establishing stakeholders’ views on the extent of conversion or 
degradation and the identification and protection of ‘set-aside areas.’ The latter are excluded 
from development and targeted for conservation enhancement measures, which should be 
                                                 
42
  OECD Council, ‘OECD Guidelines Update 2011 – Note by the Secretary-General’, Appendix II, para. 
II.A.10’ and OECD Guidelines, above n 16, chapter VI, para 6.d. 
43  
Which are defined at para 2 of 2012 IFC Performance Standard 6, above n 19, ‘Biodiversity Conservation 
and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources’, as the ‘benefits that people, including 
businesses, derive from ecosystem services’ (emphasis added). The definition is clearly based on the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, a global scientific process that facilitated intergovernmental 
endorsement of the term ‘ecosystem services’: The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and 
Human Well-Being: Synthesis (2005), <http://www.maweb.org/en/index.aspx>. For a discussion of legal 
implications, see E. Morgera, The 2005 UN World Summit and the Environment: The Proverbial Half-Full 
Glass 15 Italian Y.B. Int’l L. 53 (2006). 
44
  2012 IFC Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability, 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/policyreview.nsf/Content/SustainabilityPolicy, para 10-11 and 15 . 
45
  2012 IFC Performance Standard 3: Resource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention, above n 19, para. 7-8.  
46
  Ibid., para. 9, 12 and 17. 
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identified by their ‘high conservation value’ based on internationally recognised guidelines.47 
A new section on the management of ecosystem services has also been added, which calls 
upon the business entity to determine likely adverse impacts on ecosystem services, and 
systematically identify priority ecosystem services (either those having adverse impacts on 
affected communities or those on which the project will be directly dependent for its 
operations) with stakeholder participation. These are aimed to avoid negative impacts, or 
minimise them and implement measures to increase the operations’ resource efficiency.48 
Furthermore, additional requirements have been put in place for clients engaged in primary 
production of living natural resources (including forestry, agriculture, animal husbandry, 
fisheries and aquaculture), particularly in the absence of appropriate and applicable global, 
regional or national standards. These additional requirements include: committing to applying 
international industry operating principles and good management practices and available 
technology; actively engaging and supporting the development of national standards, for the 
definition and demonstration of sustainable practices; and (as was the case in the previous 
version of the Standards) committing to achieving certification.
49
 Finally, private companies 
are also expected to prefer suppliers that can demonstrate that they are not significantly 
impacting on natural or critical habitats.
50
 
The 2011 review of two of the most influential international sets of corporate 
environmental accountability standards has therefore led to a sophistication of the pre-
existing procedural standards, bringing them into line with parallel developments related to 
business and human rights, and unprecedented guidance on substantive standards related to 
climate change, biodiversity and resource efficiency. 
1.2 Business and Human Rights: what role for corporate environmental accountability 
standards? 
Interestingly, little of the impressive normative convergence achieved by mid-2000s had been 
used explicitly in the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights – the framework 
elaborated by the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, John Ruggie, 
appointed by the UN Secretary-General to continue discussions on corporate accountability 
                                                 
47
  2012 IFC Standard 6, para 14 and fn 10. 
48
  Ibid, para. 24-25. 
49
  Ibid., para 26 and 29-30. 
50
  Ibid, para 31. 
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in the absence of State endorsement of the UN Norms.
51
 It could rather be argued that the 
2011 reviews of the OECD Guidelines and the IFC Performance Standards filled a gap 
concerning environmental accountability in the UN Framework. 
 The UN Framework emerged from the rejection of the idea that there are direct legal 
obligations arising of international law for companies, and the support for international 
standards that are in ‘the process of being socially constructed’52 in the face of the ‘fluid’ 
applicability of international legal principles to companies’ acts.53 The Special Representative 
thus pointed to ‘standards’ governing corporate ‘responsibility’ – understood as the legal, 
social or moral obligations imposed on companies – and on corporate ‘accountability’ – 
understood as the mechanisms to hold companies to their obligations.
54
 Ruggie did so on the 
understanding that corporations are under growing scrutiny by international human rights 
mechanisms and have been the object of the standard-setting, and accountability mechanisms 
created by international organisations, in light of ‘social expectations by States and other 
actors’.55 Such practice was considered by the Special Representative as ‘blurring the lines 
between [what is] strictly voluntary, and mandatory’ and recognising the need to ‘exercise 
shared responsibility.’56 As a result, the Representative put forward a Framework built on 
three pillars (“Protect, Respect and Remedy”), namely: the State duty to protect against 
human rights abuses by business; the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and the 
need for greater access to effective remedies. Notably, the second pillar consists of the 
                                                 
51
  UNCHR Res 2005/69 (20 April 2005), which proposed that the Special Representative: (i) identify and 
clarify standards of corporate responsibility and accountability for MNCs and other business; (ii) elaborate 
on the role of States in effectively regulating, and adjudicating on the role of MNCs, including through 
international cooperation; (iii) develop methodologies for human rights impact assessment of activities of 
MNCs, and other business; (iv) and compile a compendium of best practices of States, MNCs, and other 
businesses.  
52
  UNCHR, ‘Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises’ UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/97 (2006), 
para 55. 
53
  Ibid, para 64. 
54
  ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Mapping International Standards of 
Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts’ UN Doc A/HRC/4/35 (2007), para 6. 
55
  Ibid, para. 44-46. 
56
  Ibid para. 61-62. 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2012/06 
 
Page 11 of 28 
 
prevailing societal expectation that companies ‘do no harm’ and exercise ‘due diligence’57 – 
the same language that could already be found in the 2006 IFC Performance Standards.
58
  
While the Special Representative stressed the importance for the Framework of 
international policy coherence,
59
 particularly with specific regard to “prevailing social norms 
… that have acquired near-universal recognition by all stakeholders,”60 there was, however, 
no attempt to seek or acknowledge synergies between the UN Framework and relevant 
widely ratified international environmental agreements in the specific case of natural resource 
exploitation
61
  -- an area in which serious corporate abuses of human rights have been 
documented. Nonetheless, the Special Representative developed the procedural aspect of his 
proposed human rights due diligence process on concepts and approaches
62
 that have been 
developed and experimented in the environmental sphere, notably: (i) impact assessment; (ii) 
stakeholder involvement in decision-making; and (iii) life-cycle management.
63
 
The 2011 Guiding Principles to implement the UN Framework clarify that there is a 
‘global standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they operate’, that 
exists independently of States’ abilities and willingness to fulfil their human rights 
obligations. Such global standard operates ‘over and above compliance with national laws 
and regulations protecting human rights,’ basically requiring business entities to take 
adequate measures to prevent, mitigate and remediate adverse human rights impacts.
64
 The 
                                                 
57
  HRC, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for 
Business and Human Rights’ UN Doc A/HRC/8/35 (2008), para. 25 and 58. Due diligence in the context of 
business and human rights is indeed defined as the ‘process whereby companies not only ensure compliance 
with national laws but also manage the risk of human rights harm with a view to avoiding it’, based on 
reasonable expectations (para 25). 
58
  For an earlier, more detailed assessment, see Morgera, above n 2, 98-101. 
59
  Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, Business and Human Rights: Further steps toward the 
operationalisation of the “protect, respect and remedy” framework  UN Doc A/HRC/14/27 (2010), para 52. 
60
  Ibid., 13. 
61
 The UN Representative indicated that the scope of corporate responsibility to respect human rights is defined 
by the actual and potential human rights impacts generated by business, which can be identified on the basis 
of an authoritative list of international recognised rights including the “International Bill of Rights”, 
Conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and depending on circumstances also human 
rights instruments concerning specifically indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups: Report of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises, “Business and human rights: Towards operationalising the ‘Protect, Respect 
and Remedy’ Framework” UN Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (2009), at 15. 
62
  Ibid, at 14. 
63
  E Morgera, Expert Report Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights in the Environmental Sphere, 
European Commission-funded project ‘STUDY OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT APPLICABLE TO EUROPEAN ENTERPRISES OPERATING OUTSIDE 
THE EUROPEAN UNION’, May 2010, at 12. The report is available online at: 
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/euenterpriseslf/documents/files/CSREnvironment.pdf. 
64
  UN Special Representative on Human Rights and Business Enterprises, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights to implement the UN Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework’, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 
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Guidelines further clarify that the human rights due diligence process entails: (i) assessing 
actual and potential impacts with ‘meaningful consultations’ with potentially affected groups 
and other stakeholders at regular intervals; (ii) integrating the assessment findings in internal 
decision-making budget allocation and oversight processes; (iii) acting upon those findings; 
(iv) tracking responses (including by drawing on feedback from affected stakeholders); and 
(v) communicating how impacts are addressed to right-holders in a manner that is sufficient 
for stakeholders to evaluate the adequacy of the company’s response.65 Companies are 
expected to prioritise the prevention and mitigation of most severe impacts or those that a 
delayed response would make irremediable.
66
 Finally, enterprises ‘should establish or 
participate in’ legitimate, transparent, predictable, equitable, and right-compatible grievance 
mechanisms that are directly accessible to individuals and communities that may directly be 
affected by their business operations, with a view to both supporting the identification of 
adverse impacts and systematic problems, and remedying adverse impacts.
67
 The Guiding 
Principles, therefore, continue the self-referential trend of the UN Framework, with no 
specific reference to the relevance of multilateral environmental agreements. No reference 
was made to specific rights of indigenous peoples either, which could have provided a bridge 
between human rights to environmental protection discourses. 
This mismatch between the work of the UN Special Representative and international 
initiatives contributing to defining corporate environmental accountability standards has been 
recently picked up by the UN Rapporteur on indigenous peoples’ rights, James Anaya, who 
started addressing corporate environmental accountability issues in 2009.
68
 Anaya noted that 
private companies engaging or promoting extractive or other development activities affecting 
indigenous peoples should themselves “as a matter of company policy” endeavour to 
conform their behaviour at all times to relevant international norms concerning the rights of 
indigenous peoples, including those norms related to consultation. To this end, he 
recommended that companies identify, fully incorporate and make operative the norms 
concerning the rights of indigenous peoples within every aspect of their work carried out 
within or in close proximity to indigenous lands. In addition, as part of their due diligence, 
                                                                                                                                                       
(2011), para 11 (the Guiding Principles were adopted by the Human Rights Council by Resolution 
A/HRC/17/4 (2011); see also Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights press release, ‘New 
Guiding Principles on Business and human rights endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council’, 16 June 
2011). 
65
  Guiding Principles, above n 63, para. 17-21. 
66
  Ibid, para 24. 
67
  Ibid, para. 29 and 31. 
68
  A/HRC/12/34, above n 39, Section E. 
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companies should avoid endorsing or contributing to any act or omission on the part of the 
State amounting to a failure to adequately consult with the affected indigenous community 
before proceeding with a project. The Special Rapporteur furthermore recommended that 
States develop specific mechanisms to closely monitor company behaviour to ensure full 
respect for indigenous peoples’ right and that required consultations are fully and adequately 
employed.
69
  
In 2010, Anaya expanded upon this preliminary guidance by devoting the substantive 
section of his annual report to corporate accountability. He thus fleshed out standards for 
corporate accountability emerging from the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP)
70
 and other human rights instruments and processes, to be incorporated in 
the understanding of the due diligence framework proposed by the UN Special 
Representative on Human Rights and Business.
71
 Anaya proposed that companies identify 
prior to commencing their activities all matters related to the basic human rights of 
indigenous peoples with a view to taking them into account when their activities are carried 
out. He emphasised that social and environmental impact studies should be conducted on 
behalf of companies by independent experts under the supervision of the State, specifically 
referring in this respect to guidance on  cultural, social and environmental assessments 
adopted under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) - the Akwé: Kon Guidelines.
72
 
As a result of these assessments, companies are expected to take all possible technically 
feasible solutions to mitigate likely negative impacts on the environment and social, 
economic, cultural and spiritual life of indigenous peoples. Where adverse impacts cannot be 
avoided, Anaya indicated that indigenous peoples are entitled to just and fair redress.
73
  
Anaya also devoted significant attention to the question of benefit-sharing - a concept 
that figured prominently in the 2011 revision of the IFC Performance Standards discussed 
above. He emphasised that in addition to entitlement to compensation, indigenous peoples 
have a right to share in the benefits arising from business activities taking place on their 
traditional lands or in relation to their traditionally used natural resources. Accordingly, he 
argued that due diligence would imply that companies set up specific benefit-sharing 
                                                 
69
  Ibid. 
70  
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNGA Resolution 61/295 (13 September 2007). 
71
  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous 
people, James Anaya, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/37 (2010), Section III. 
72
 Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines for the Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact Assessment 
regarding Developments Proposed to Take Place on, or which are Likely to Impact on, Sacred Sites and on 
Lands and Waters Traditionally Occupied or Used by Indigenous and Local Communities, in Article 8(j) and 
related provisions (CBD COP 7 Decision VII/16F, 13 April 2004). 
73
  Ibid., para. 73-74. 
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mechanisms, based on international standards, genuinely strengthening the capacity of 
indigenous peoples to establish and follow up on their development priorities and supporting 
communities’ own decision-making mechanisms.74 
Overall, Anaya clearly indicated that concepts such as benefit-sharing
75
 and socio-
cultural and environmental impact assessments, as elaborated upon under the CBD through 
the Akwé: Kon Guidelines, can significantly contribute to fleshing out standards for 
corporate accountability with respect to indigenous rights in the context of the due diligence 
framework proposed by the UN Special Representative on Human Rights and Business. The 
same understanding seems to emerge from other indigenous rights processes. The Expert 
Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in 2010, stressed the link between prior 
informed consent, benefit-sharing and mitigation measures in the context of large-scale 
natural resource extraction on indigenous peoples’ territories or the creation of national parks, 
forest and game reserves, underscoring the importance of the CBD work programme on 
protected areas
76
 and the Akwé: Kon Guidelines.
77
 These references - which are reflected to a 
great extent in the IFC Performance Standards - are significant in ensuring a coherent 
approach to corporate environmental accountability across different international bodies, and 
ultimately to contribute to substantive unity across different areas of international law. 
1.3 From CSR to Corporate Accountability Through Multiple Monitoring Mechanisms  
Several international initiatives have not limited themselves to standard-setting for corporate 
environmental accountability, but have also put in place mechanisms to monitor corporate 
conduct and/or to consider complaints from members of the public. These are key steps in 
bringing to light instances of unsustainable corporate conduct or to proactively manage 
possible conflicts through an independent mechanism for assessing facts and facilitating the 
identification of constructive solutions. These mechanisms may provide a readily-available 
and impartial avenue for individuals, communities and civil society groups to have their 
                                                 
74
  Ibid., para. 76-80. 
75
  The legal concept of benefit-sharing has been developed under the CBD not only in the context of access to 
genetic resources, but also with regard to the conservation and sustainable use of biological resources (such 
as protected areas, tourism, and forest management): see E Morgera and E Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of 
Benefit-sharing: Linking Biodiversity and Community Livelihoods” (2010) 19 RECIEL 150-173. 
76
  Programme of Work on Protected Areas, adopted by CBD COP Decision VII/28, Protected Areas (2004), 
Annex. 
77
  Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Progress report on the study on indigenous peoples 
and the right to participate in decision-making, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/35 (2010); and Report of the Expert 
Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on its third session, Geneva (12-16 July 2010), UN Doc. 
A/HRC/15/36 (2010). 
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complaints against private companies heard, going beyond the hurdles and bias that may be 
experienced in accessing justice at the national level. These mechanisms may also serve the 
legitimate interests of private companies to have allegations against them assessed by an 
independent entity through their fact-finding activities on the ground, and through the good 
offices of an independent mediator in helping prevent conflicts from emerging or escalating. 
From a broader perspective, these mechanisms also offer concrete opportunities to test the 
suitability of corporate environmental accountability standards, further clarifying the 
conditions for their applicability to private companies in different contexts. Furthermore, they 
may contribute to ensure a coherent approach to corporate accountability, by making 
systematic reference to those international standards that emerge as common from different 
international standard-setting initiatives.   
 Four illustrations of such international mechanisms will be offered in the following 
sub-sections, focusing first, more briefly, on the more recent system for handling allegations 
of severe environmental damage under the UN Global Compact and the consideration of 
communications on alleged violations of indigenous rights by the UN Rapporteur on 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights. Then, two more in-depth case-studies will focus on the well-
established practice of two  other accountability systems: the international compliance body 
established by the IFC to resolve complaints related to its Performance Standards, and the 
implementation procedure established under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises. 
3.1 The Global Compact’s Integrity Measures 
The UN Global Compact, even if it was ‘not designed, nor does it have the mandate or 
resources, to monitor or measure participants’ performance,’78 has developed a procedure to 
handle ‘credible allegations of systematic or egregious abuse of the Global Compact’s overall 
aims and principles.’79 The procedure aims to safeguarde the reputation, integrity and good 
efforts of the initiative, as well as to promote continuous quality improvement and assist 
participants in aligning their actions with their commitments. Abuse includes ‘severe 
environmental damage,’80 which is particularly significant as the vast majority of companies 
participating in the Compact tend to emphasize their adherence to the environment-related 
                                                 
78
  UN Global Compact, ‘Note on Integrity Measures’, 12 April 2010, at 1. 
79
 Ibid. On the origins of the procedure, see K. Norwrot, ‘The New Governance Structure of the Global 
Compact: Transforming a “Learning Network” into a Federalized and Parlamentarized Transnational 
Regulatory Regime’ Essays in Transnational Economic Law 47 (2005), at 24-30. 
80
  UN Global Compact Office, ‘Frequently Asked Questions on the Integrity Measures’ (2009). 
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principles of the initiative.
81
  
 According to the procedure, any written complaint can be submitted by any 
individual, organisation or state to the Global Compact Office, which will require the relevant 
company to provide written comments and keep it informed of action undertaken to address 
the situation. While the Office will not make any assessment of its own as to the matter at 
hand, it will provide guidance and assistance to the company in taking action to remedy the 
situation. More interestingly, the Office can also, including of its own initiative, refer the 
matter to the relevant UN entity (in the case of environmental principles, the UN 
Environment Programme) for advice, assistance or action; or refer the matter to the Global 
Compact Board, to draw on its business members’ expertise. The Office may further share 
with parties information about the compliance procedure under the OECD Guidelines 
(discussed below), which could provide for some cooperation, or at least some linkages 
between two distinct international accountability processes. If a company refuses to engage in 
dialogue within two months or if the review of the complaint reveals something detrimental 
to the reputation and integrity of the Global Compact, the Office will remove the company 
from its list of participants.
82
 Overall, the procedure has been described, in low-key terms, as 
a ‘dialogue facilitation mechanism,’83 and it has already been suggested that the mechanism 
could be strengthened by empowering the Global Compact Office to ‘mediate the process and 
seek to define conditions to be met by companies in order to remain a Compact participant.’84 
 While this mechanism has some potential to monitor private companies’ compliance 
with the environmental principles of the Global Compact, information available on the 
complaints dealt with is at the time of writing very limited and would not allow a more 
detailed discussion in this chapter. This lack of transparency concerning the complaint 
procedure has already been highlighted within the UN System.
85
 Information on integrity 
cases is being included in the Global Compact Annual Review starting from the 2009 edition, 
but to date these reports have limited themselves to note the number of cases received and 
                                                 
81
 R. Barkemeyer, Beyond Compliance - Below Expectations? Cross-border CSR, Development and the UN 
Global Compact (SSRN, 2009) at 15. 
82
  UN Global Compact Office, above n. 77, at 2-4. 
83
 U. Wynhoven and M. Stausberg, ‘The United Nations Global Compact’s Governance Framework and 
Integrity Measures’ in A. Rasche and G. Kell, The United Nations Global Compact: Achievements, Trends and 
Challenges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 251, at 262-263. 
84
 E. Brugger and P. Maurer, ‘Concluding Remarks’ in Rasche and Kell, above n. 82, 386, at 395. 
85
  Joint Inspection Unit, above n 18, para. 70-73 and recommendation 6(d). See also ‘A response from the 
Global Compact Office’ above n 18, at 5. 
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handled by the Global Compact Office,
86
 without providing any further information - not 
even with reference to the specific principles that were alleged to be seriously violated by the 
company. This practice can be contrasted with that of the implementation procedure of the 
OECD Guidelines, discussed below: although until mid-2000s the OECD did not publish the 
names of companies involved in instances under consideration by its implementation 
procedure, it provided an annual update of the status of each instance with specific reference 
to the guideline alleged to be non-complied. This was, however, largely considered 
insufficient, and an NGO named “OECDWatch” started to independently produce quarterly 
updates on the filing, conclusion or rejections of instances.
87
  
  
 
3.2 Communications to the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
Attention can now turn to the incipient practice of UN Rapporteur on Indigenous  Peoples’ 
Rights in addressing communications on alleged violations of indigenous rights.
88
 In his first 
report to the General Assembly, James Anaya prioritised among four areas for his work, the 
task of responding on an ongoing basis to specific cases of alleged human rights violations, 
noting that cases hitherto brought to his attention included infringements of the right to free, 
prior informed consent, especially in relation to natural resource extraction and displacement 
or removal of indigenous communities, and denial of rights of indigenous peoples to lands 
and resources.
89
 Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur established a practice of gathering, 
requesting, receiving and exchanging information from all relevant sources, notably from 
indigenous peoples and governments, and carrying out on-site visits to examine the issues 
raised with a view to providing observations and recommendations on the underlying human 
rights issues.  
                                                 
86
 The 2010 edition of the Annual Report states that ‘21 separate matters alleging abuses of the Ten Principles 
by business entities were raised with the Global Compact Office in 2010 [of which] 3 matters were handled 
under the Integrity Measures dialogue facilitation mechanism’ (UN Global Compact Office, 2010 Annual 
Report of the Global Compact (UN, 2011), at 42). Similar information is provided in the 2009 edition (UN 
Global Compact Office, 2010 Annual Report of the Global Compact (UN, 2010), at 20). 
87
  E. Morgera, ‘An Environmental Outlook on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: 
Comparative Advantage, Legitimacy, and Outstanding Questions in the Lead-up to the 2006 Review’, (2006) 18 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 751, at 774. The OECDWatch database is still 
functioning at the time of writing and can be freely consulted at http://oecdwatch.org/cases. 
88
  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous 
people: Communications to and from Governments, A/HRC/15/37/Add.1 (2010). 
89
  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous 
people, UN Doc. A/64/338 (2009), Section D.  
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 While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions on this practice, it can be 
highlighted that it may provide a new avenue for indigenous communities’ complaints 
against environmentally unsustainable corporate conduct. In a case concerning the Marlin 
mine project in Guatemala and Maya indigenous communities, for instance, Anaya focused 
mostly on the regulatory and administrative shortcomings of the State, but did not shy away 
from noting that private companies had an influence on the conflicts with indigenous peoples 
in that context. He therefore concluded that companies have a ‘certain degree of 
responsibility with regard to the disrespect of indigenous rights, independently from the 
international obligations of the host state.’90 Anaya further noted that the consultations 
undertaken by the company did not lead to an adequate understanding of the project impacts 
on the communities, did not take into account sufficiently the community concerns, and in all 
events should have involved more fully the government. He thus called for a new 
consultation process focusing on mitigation measures, reparation of damage, establishment of 
a formal mechanism for benefit-sharing with full participation of the relevant communities, 
and the establishment of a complaint and conciliation mechanism.
91
 In his final 
recommendation on this case, Anaya confirmed that the private enterprises’ faults in due 
diligence could not be justified only by the limitations of the host state legal framework.
92
 He 
thus recommended that private enterprises adopt internal policies on indigenous peoples’ 
rights and independent follow-up mechanisms, as well as permanent mechanisms for 
dialogue and grievance with the participation of state authorities.
93 
  Anaya’s monitoring and normative work appear to converge in his recognition that ‘in 
its prevailing form, the model for advancing natural resource extraction within the territories 
of indigenous peoples appears to run counter to the self-determination of indigenous peoples 
in the political, social and economic spheres.’94 This conclusion led the Special Rapporteur to 
request in 2011 a mandate to elaborate a set of guidelines providing specific orientation to 
                                                 
90
  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous 
people: Observaciones sobre la situación de los derechos de los pueblos indígenas de Guatemala en relación 
con los proyectos extractivos, y otro tipo de proyectos, en sus territorios tradicionales, advance unedited 
version of 4 March 2011, para 69. 
91
  Ibid., para. 69-70. 
92
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous 
people: Observaciones sobre la situación de los derechos de los pueblos indígenas de Guatemala en relación con 
los proyectos extractivos, y otro tipo de proyectos, en sus territorios tradicionales, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/18/35/Add.3 (2011),  para. 69-72. 
93
 Ibid., para. 89-93. 
94
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous 
people, Extractive industries operating within or near indigenous territories, UN Doc. A/HRC/18/35 (2011), 
para. 82. 
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governments, indigenous peoples and corporations regarding the protection of indigenous 
peoples’ rights in the context of resource extraction or development projects.95 
 
3.3 IFC Ombudsman 
A more established practice can be studied in the context of the IFC Performance Standards. 
Complaints from those affected by IFC-financed projects can be filed before a Compliance 
Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO), an independent oversight authority that reports directly to the 
President of the World Bank Group and that thus ascertains application of the IFC Standards 
to companies.
96
 The CAO “attempts to resolve complaints through a flexible problem-solving 
approach and to enhance the environmental outcomes of the project” (Ombudsman 
function).
97
 Any person, group or community affected, or likely to be affected, by a project is 
eligible, at anytime in the project, to file complaints that may relate to any aspect of the 
planning, implementation or impact of the project, without the need to allege necessarily 
violations of specific IFC procedures and standards.
98
 When the complaint is accepted, the 
CAO decides the best course of action. Besides seeking to resolve issues for individuals who 
are directly or likely to be directly affected by IFC projects, CAO is also mandated to provide 
IFC with policy and process advice on environmental and social performance, and conduct 
environmental and social audits and reviews as an aid to institution learning (Compliance 
function).  CAO can thus decide to resolve a complaint by undertaking a compliance audit or 
exercising advisory functions instead of its Ombudsman functions. In the latter cases, the 
complainant no longer controls the process.
99
 
The Ombudsman’s modus operandi includes field visits to the site of contested projects 
and interviews with all parties involved: staff of the private company, local authorities, 
affected communities representatives, other relevant local organisations and IFC staff. 
Complaints, reports of field missions and recommendations are all published on the CAO 
website, together with updates on ongoing investigations.
100
 Among these, the most 
                                                 
95
 Ibid., para. 74-75. 
96
  2012 IFC Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability, above n 35, para. 54-57. 
97
  Ibid. 
98
  Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL), A Handbook on the Office of the Compliance 
Advisor/Ombudsman of the International Finance Corporation and Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency, September 2000, at 16, available online at www.ciel.org/Publications/CAOhandbook.pdf (‘CIEL 
Handbook’), at 5-6. 
99
  Ibid., at 8. 
100
  http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html-english/ombudsman.htm, where all the CAO documents cited below 
can be found.  
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important document is the assessment report, which is intended both as a finding of facts by 
CAO in relation to allegations contained in the complaint, and as an assessment of the 
“ripeness” of any conflict or tension for resolution or management.101 Interestingly, after 
considering complaints, the CAO formulates recommendations not only to IFC itself, but also 
directly to the private company involved, albeit such recommendations will then need to be 
endorsed by the IFC President. The latter would then transmit them to the private company 
and/or request the IFC to take the appropriate action.
102
  
In a complaint regarding a hydropower project in India,
103
 for instance, the CAO 
recommended the company to provide for an independent study of environmental concerns, 
make it public, ensure the public monitoring of resulting commitments, and generally engage 
more constructively local communities also through the intermediation of independent 
facilitators or observers. The CAO further called for developing a schedule for 
implementation of commitments resulting from the environmental impact assessment on the 
basis of each of the IFC performance standards.
104
 In addition, the CAO provided for both the 
IFC and the private company to engage in quality monitoring. The IFC, in turn, was 
requested to appoint an independent engineer to oversee the project and report on social and 
environmental matters, while the company was requested to report to IFC on a quarterly and 
annual basis on social, environmental and health issues.
105
 
In several instances, the Ombudsman considered whether the private company had 
undertaken an appropriate environmental impact assessment and whether the IFC had 
appropriately reviewed such assessment.
106
 In other instances, the Ombudsman even 
concluded that in the absence of formal non-compliance with IFC standards, companies 
should still build a climate of trust and understanding with local communities with regards to 
the environmental impacts of the project.
107
 One of the most striking features of the CAO’s 
recommendations is thus the paramount attention devoted to the perception of the 
environmental and social performance of IFC-funded projects by local communities.  
                                                 
101
  CAO, Assessment Report on the complaint concerning COMSUR/Don Mario Mine, Bolivia, November 
2003. 
102
  Ibid., at 4. 
103
  Ibid., at 7. 
104
  Ibid., 8-9. 
105
  Ibid., 14. 
106
  CAO, Assessment Report on the complaint regarding the Zambia Konkola Copper Mine Project, November 
2003, partic at 16; CAO, Assessment Report of the complaint regarding Allain Duhangan Hydropower 
Project, India, March 2005. 
107
  CAO, Assessment Report on the complaint regarding IFC’s investment in Kalahari Diamonds Ltd, 
Botswana, June 2005; CAO, Assessment Report of a complaint in relation to the Marlin Mining Project in 
Guatemala, September 2005. 
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The CAO also undertook follow-up monitoring and site visits,
108
 and where possible, it 
also engaged directly in the resolution of complaints, facilitating an agreement between the 
private sector and the complainants.
109
 Based on its activities until 2006, it could be 
concluded that CAO provided individuals and communities an avenue for expressing their 
complaints and receive prompt consideration. In more recent cases, however, the CAO 
appears to have gradually abandoned its practice of establishing its own findings and making 
its own recommendations, and rather focuses on creating the conditions for more 
collaborative interactions between the company and stakeholders, setting out steps for 
establishing or strengthening dialogue,
110
 or where dialogue is not favoured by the 
complainants, proposing to refer the case to the Compliance facility.
111
 This is confirmed by 
the fact that in recent reports the CAO explicitly cautions that it merely ‘summarizes the 
views expressed by the various stakeholders without the intention to validate or deny any 
issues.’112 
It is regrettable that the practice of the CAO has experienced a significant change, 
providing for visibly more limited discussion of the practical application of relevant 
international environmental law standards for corporate accountability, particularly because 
the IFC Performance Standards remain the most explicit and elaborated substantive standards 
on corporate environmental accountability on the basis of the CBD.
113
 
3.4 OECD Guidelines Implementation Procedure 
Although the OECD Guidelines are not as explicit or detailed with regard to corporate 
environmental accountability standards than the IFC, their implementation procedure has 
contributed on occasions to flesh out the links between corporate accountability and 
multilateral environmental agreements. The procedure
114
 is based on the creation of national 
contact points (NCPs) in adhering countries, which handle inquiries (‘specific instances’) at 
                                                 
108
  CAO, Follow-up Assessment Report on Complaint regarding the Marlin Mining Project May 2006. 
109
  CAO, Assessment Report in relation to a complaint regarding the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline 
Project, Georgia, February 2006. See also “Trouble in the Pipeline”, The Guardian, 3 September 2002. 
110
  See, for instance, CAO, Assessment Report of the complain regarding the Electron Investment S.A. Pando-
Monte Lirio Hydroelectric Project, Ciriqui Province, Panama, July 2010, at 20-21. 
111
  CAO, Assessment Report to Stakeholders regarding concerns of local stakeholders about the PRONACA 
Farms In Santo Domingo, Ecuador, June 2011. 
112
  CAO, Pando assessment report, above n 109, at 18. 
113
  In addition to 2012 IFC Performance Standard 6 (discussed under section 1 above), also 2012 IFC, 
Performance Standard 8: Cultural Heritage, above n 19, para 1, is “based in part on standards set by the 
Convention on Biological Diversity”. 
114
 The Implementation Procedure of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises is included in Part II 
of the OECD Guidelines, above n 16, section I. 
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the national level.
115
 The procedure is subject to the oversight by the OECD Investment 
Committee (CIME), which issues clarifications (providing additional information about 
whether and how the Guidelines apply to a particular business situation, without assessing the 
appropriateness of that enterprise’s conduct), reviews the Guidelines and is ultimately 
responsible for their interpretation.
116
 Specific instances are basically a means for any 
‘interested party’ to draw the NCP’s attention to a company’s alleged non-observance of the 
Guidelines.
117
 NCPs make an initial assessment of the issue and then offer their services as 
mediators. If the conflict is not resolved, it can be referred to the CIME, where non-binding 
decisions are taken by consensus. In the vast majority of cases, however, the onus of 
attempting to resolve specific instances and ensuring the effectiveness of the Guidelines is 
largely upon NCPs.
118
  
Disappointment, however, has been expressed for quite some time about the weak 
implementation mechanism of the Guidelines,
119
 including by the UN Special Representative 
on Human Rights.
120
 The lack of predictable timelines for NCPs to acknowledge receipt of, 
or respond to, instances in an efficient and timely manner also raised concerns.
121
 To some 
extent these shortcomings were addressed in the 2011 review, which resulted in spelling out 
                                                 
115
  Ibid., section II. 
116
  P. Acconci, ‘The Promotion of Responsible Business Conduct and the New Text of the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises’ (2001) 2 Journal of World Investment 123, 140–41. 
117
  P. van der Gaag, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises:  Corporate Accountability in a 
Liberalised Economy?’ (November 2004) <http://www.oecdwatch.org/docs/paper%20NC%20IUCN.pdf>, 
3.  
118
  J. Karl, ‘The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, in M. K. Addo (ed), Human Rights Standards 
and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) 89, 92–
5. 
119
 Friends of the Earth ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (undated) 
<http://www.foe.org/oecdguidelines/> 6; OECD, Roundtable on Corporate Responsibility: Encouraging the 
Positive Contribution of Business to Environment through the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises. Background Report (June 2004) 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,2340,en_2649_34889_31711425_1_1_1_1,00.html> (hereinafter, 
OECD 2004 Roundtable Background Report) 12; UNCTAD, ‘Disclosure of the Impact of Corporations on 
Society: Current Trends and Issues’ (15 August 2003) UN Doc TD/B/COM.2/ISAR/20, 6. Other critiques 
concerned: the lack of independent verification of whether companies follow the Guidelines, the 
confidentiality rule applied in the ‘best interests’ of the implementation of the Guidelines, and the failure by 
NCPs to issue statements and make recommendations when no agreement can be achieved between the 
parties concerned. V. Nilsson, ‘The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations in Practice’ (Paper 
Presented at the OECD Global Forum on International Investment — Investment for Development: Forging 
New Partnerships, 19–21 October 2004) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/61/33807212.pdf>. 
120
  Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’, above n 56, para 98.  
121
  ‘Letter from Friends of the Earth to Wesley Scholz, Director, Office of Investment Affairs and National 
Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Department of State 3–8’ (29 April 
2003) <http://www.foe.org/camps/intl/Appendices/OECDComplaint.pdf>. The letter reports that under the 
agreement between the consortium and Turkey, Turkey is committed to compensating the Consortium if 
new taxes or health, safety, or environment laws adversely affect the finances of the project. Turkey also 
cannot impose any future environmental and social standards affecting the pipeline that are more stringent 
than ‘those operating elsewhere in the petroleum industry.’ 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2012/06 
 
Page 23 of 28 
 
principles for NCP ‘functional equivalence’ (accessibility, transparency, predictability, 
impartiality, accountability, efficiency and timeliness), while leaving adhering governments 
flexibility in their set-up as long as NCPs are enabled to operate in an impartial manner while 
maintaining an adequate level of accountability to the adhering government.
122
 The 2011 
review also called for the systematic publication of the outcomes of the NCP procedure and 
detailed their minimum content: NCP statements should at a minimum describe the issue 
raised and the reasons for the NCP decision, and emit recommendations on the 
implementation of the Guidelines ‘as appropriate.’123 The Commentary also provided 
indicative timelines: three months for the initial assessment of instances and three months for 
issuing a statement of report following the conclusion of the procedure, with a view to 
concluding the whole procedure in 12 months.
124
 The 2011 review has, however, been 
criticised by civil society organisations for the lack of specification as to NCPs’ role in 
identifying breaches of the Guidelines and providing recommendations, including 
consequences for companies’ failure to engage in the implementation procedure, as well as in 
monitoring and following up on their recommendations.
125
 
Instances considered before the 2011 review have concerned different parts of the 
environmental recommendations of the Guidelines, often focusing on the recommendation 
regarding assessment and communication to the communities affected by the environmental 
impacts of projects in developing countries. Many questions, however, remain unanswered as 
to the direct application to MNEs of standards based on general environmental principles, 
such as precaution and sustainable development as reflected in the Guidelines. In some cases, 
the NCP recommended that, in a weak legal and regulatory system, MNEs should do their 
utmost to implement the internationally acknowledged best practices that they follow in their 
own country on the construction site and for the people affected by their activity, making 
reference to environmental impact assessment and consultations.
126 
In other instances, 
instead, the NCP recommended respecting the legal standards of the company’s home 
                                                 
122
  OECD Guidelines Update 2011 – Commentaries, above n 31, para 9; and OECD Guidelines Update 2011 – 
Note by the Secretary-General, above n 31, Appendix III, section I. A and C. The ‘Procedural Guidance’ and 
its Commentary are included in Part II of the OECD Guidelines, above n 16. 
123
  OECD Guidelines Note by the Secretary-General, above n 31, Appendix III, section I.C,  para 3. 
124
  OECD Guidelines Update 2011 – Commentaries, above n 31, para 40. 
125
  See sources cited at note 33. 
126
  French NCP, ‘Recommendations intended for EDF and its Partners with Regard to the Implementation of 
the ‘Nam Theun 2’ Project in Laos’ (1 April 2005) <http://www.reports-and-materials.org/French-NCP-
Nam-Theun-2-recommendations-1-April-2005.doc>. 
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country to its activities abroad.
127
 In yet other instances, the NCP statement focused on 
institutionalising channels for communication and information exchange between the 
company and affected constituencies.
128
 
Although NCPs have made uneven references to international standards for corporate 
accountability, the UK NCP set a significant precedent in 2009. It addressed a complaint 
brought to its attention by Survival International, a UK-based NGO, against Vedanta, a UK-
registered mining company operating directly or through subsidiaries in India, concerning the 
use of forest land for bauxite mining near Lanjigarh for failing to consult with an indigenous 
group affected by its operations, the Dongria Kondh. The NCP found, mostly on the basis of 
evidence from the complainant (as Vedanta did not engage fully in the procedure and its own 
investigations), that Vedanta had failed to put in place an adequate and timely consultation 
mechanism to engage fully the Dongria Kondh. Accordingly, the NCP declared non-
compliance with, inter alia, the Guidelines sections on engaging in adequate and timely 
communication and consultation with the communities directly affected by the environmental 
policies of the enterprise and by their implementation. It further found that Vedanta did not 
respect the rights and freedoms of the Dongria Kondh in a manner consistent with India’s 
commitments under various international instruments, including the CBD and the UNDRIP. 
Specifically, the NCP used the CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines to interpret the OECD 
Guidelines provisions on consultations on environmental impacts,
129
 to determine that 
Vedanta did not employ the local language or means of communication other than written 
form for consultations with communities with very high rate of illiteracy. It also found that 
the environmental impact assessment that had been carried out, although including an 
analysis of the “socio-economic environment” of the study area, did not address the impact of 
the mine on the community.
130
 The NCP concluded that the company did not carry out 
adequate or timely consultations about the potential environmental impact of the construction 
of the mine on them.
131
 The NCP thus recommended that Vedanta engage in consultations 
                                                 
127
  Van der Gaag, above n 116, according to whom an NCP report in October 2003 recommended that 
environmental standards of Nutreco in Chile should progressively be brought into line with those found in 
the Netherlands. 
128
  Government of Canada, ‘Annual Report 2002: Canada’s National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises’ (2002) <http://www.ncp-pcn.gc.ca/annual_2002-en.asp#implementation>. 
The NCP suggested establishing a Land Task Force Committee by the company, the local government, and 
local NGOs, with the mandate to, inter alia, protect the environment, provide information to the public on 
land and environmental issues, and resolve any land disputes at the local level. 
129
  UK NCP, Final Statement on the Complaint from Survival International against Vedanta Resources plc, 25 
September 2009, para. 44-46, at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file53117.doc 
130
  Ibid, para 57. 
131
  Ibid., para 65 and 67. 
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with the indigenous group on access to the project affected area, ways to secure its traditional 
livelihood, and alternative arrangements (other than re-settlement) for the affected families 
according to the process outlined in the CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines. At a minimum, the 
NCP expected Vedanta to advertise the consultation in a language and form that could be 
easily understood by the Dongria Kondh, thereby ensuring the participation of the maximum 
number of their representatives in the consultation
132
 Interestingly, the NCP also underlined 
that in carrying out a human rights impact assessment, as suggested by the UN Framework on 
Business and Human Rights, the Akwé: Kon Guidelines could be used as a point of 
reference, particularly for carrying out indigenous groups’ impact assessments.133 
The follow-up statement by the NCP, however, provided a mixed picture, with the NGO 
claiming that no change in the company’s conduct could be detected while Vedanta reported 
on specific action being undertaken following consultations with affected communities, and 
no comment provided by the NCP.
134
 Nevertheless, the case remains groundbreaking in 
showing how the OECD Guidelines implementation procedure can significantly point to 
companies’ shortcomings vis-à-vis international environmental standards, as well as lead to 
coherent interpretation and application of different international sources of corporate 
environmental accountability standards. To the latter end, the NCP proposed filling a gap in 
the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights through CBD guidelines. 
1.4. Institutional Fragmentation and Substantive Unity: the Role of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity  
Although the multiplicity of international standard-setting and monitoring mechanisms 
related to corporate accountability inevitably creates the risk of fragmentation of international 
guidance on corporate accountability, the above discussion has clarified that such risk is 
significantly mitigated by the convergence of the standards used to assess private companies’ 
conduct. In particular, environmental standards for corporate accountability have explicitly or 
implicitly facilitated progress in standard-setting and influenced the international debate on 
corporate accountability tout court, by providing key elements of the due diligence 
framework on business and human rights such as impact assessment, stakeholder 
consultations, and more recently benefit-sharing.  
                                                 
132
  Ibid, para. 73-74. 
133
  Ibid., 79. 
134
  Follow up to Final Statement by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises: Complaint from Survival International against Vedanta Resources plc (12 March 2010). 
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Specific guidance elaborated in the context of the Convention on Biological Diversity has 
clearly influenced the practice of corporate accountability mechanisms, providing detailed 
procedures that have received the endorsement of the CBD’s virtually universal membership. 
Notably, the CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines
135
 have been used more and more often in different 
contexts to assess whether private companies’ conduct is acceptable in light of international 
human rights standards, thus showing that it is possible to ensure substantive unity across 
different areas of international law that may be negatively affected by the conduct of private 
operators. Other CBD guidelines can also serve as a benchmark for the conduct of the private 
sector: this is the case of the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines on Sustainable Use,
136
 
the Guidelines on Biodiversity and Tourism Development,
137
 and the Tkariwaié:ri Code of 
Ethical Conduct on respect for the cultural and intellectual heritage of indigenous and local 
communities relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.
138
 Other 
guidelines may also be relevant for corporate environmental accountability purposes, such as 
those included in the CBD work programmes on protected areas, mountain and forest 
biodiversity.
139
 All these instruments include specific procedures underpinning private 
companies’ interactions with indigenous and local communities.140 
The CBD has thus provided a virtually universal forum for reaching intergovernmental 
consensus on standards for corporate environmental accountability with significant human 
rights dimensions.
141
 This has occurred even before the Convention parties and Secretariat 
started activities specifically targeting the involvement of the business community into the 
                                                 
135
  Although they are directed to Parties and governments, the Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines, above n 71, 
are expected to provide a collaborative framework for Governments, indigenous and local communities, 
decision makers and managers of developments (para 3) (emphasis added). 
136
  Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable use of Biodiversity, CBD Decision VII/12, 
Sustainable Use (Article 10) (2004), Annex II, para 1 clarifies that ‘The principles provide a framework for 
advising Governments, resource managers, indigenous and local communities, the private sector and other 
stakeholders about how they can ensure that their use of the components of biodiversity will not lead to the 
long-term decline of biological diversity’ (emphasis added). 
137
  International guidelines for activities related to sustainable tourism development in vulnerable terrestrial, 
marine and coastal ecosystems and habitats of major importance for biological diversity and protected areas, 
including fragile riparian and mountain ecosystems, CBD Decision VII/14, Biological Diversity and 
Tourism (2004), Annex, para 2 clarifies that the Guidelines provide a framework for addressing what the 
proponent of new tourism investment or activities should do to seek approval, as well as technical guidance 
to managers with responsibility concerning tourism and biodiversity (emphasis added). 
138
  CBD Decision X/42, The Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct to Ensure Respect for the Cultural and 
Intellectual Heritage of Indigenous and Local Communities (2010).  
139
  Expanded Programme of Work on Forest Biological Diversity, CBD Decision VI/22, Forest biological 
diversity (2002), Annex. 
140
 Morgera and Tsioumani, above n 74, at 165 and 167. 
141
  E. Morgera, E. Tsioumani, ‘Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Looking Afresh at the Convention on 
Biological Diversity” (2011) 21 Yearbook of International Environmental Law [please add initial page]. 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2012/06 
 
Page 27 of 28 
 
CBD implementation in 2005.
142
 Notably, according to the most recent decision of the CBD 
Conference of the Parties on the subject of private sector involvement, business entities are 
encouraged to monitor and assess impacts on biodiversity and ecosystem services, to develop 
and apply processes and production methods that minimise or avoid negative impacts on 
biodiversity, and ‘take into account, as appropriate, the Akwé: Kon Guidelines.’143 The CBD 
normative activity is particularly significant in supporting a coherent approach to corporate 
environmental accountability bridging human rights and environmental perspectives with its 
focus on indigenous and local communities, and covering several environmental issues in 
light of the ecosystem approach,
144
 particularly with regard to consultation, impact 
assessment and benefit-sharing. 
On the other hand, the CBD Secretariat has participated in various activities that directly 
engaged private companies,
145
 such as collaboration with the UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues, and an association of private enterprises that elaborated the Natural 
Resources Stewardship Circle Declaration to provide guidance to the aromatic, perfume, and 
cosmetics industry interacting with indigenous peoples.
146
 Another example concerns the 
BioTrade Initiative that was initiated under the aegis of the UN Commission on Trade and 
Development
147
 to engage private companies to develop a verification framework that will 
formally recognise their efforts towards conservation, sustainability and benefit-sharing.
148
 
Several other initiatives
149
 confirm that the CBD is not only contributing to the international 
debate on corporate accountability through standard-setting but also through direct 
engagement with the private sector.
150
 
 
                                                 
142
  For an early assessment, see Morgera, above n 2, chapter 8, based on CBD Decision VIII/11 ‘Private Sector 
Engagement’ (2006) and CBD COP decision IX/26 ‘Promoting Business Engagement’ (2008). 
143
  CBD Decision X/21, Business engagement (2010), para 2(b)-(c). 
144
 Principles of the Ecosystem approach, in Ecosystem approach (CBD Decision V/6, 22 June 2000), Annex B 
and Refinement and Elaboration of the Ecosystem Approach, Based on Assessment of Experience of Parties in 
Implementation, in Ecosystem approach (CBD Decision VII/11, 13 April 2004), Annex I. 
145
  See discussion in Morgera, Tsioumani, above n 74, at 165-167.  
146
  See the report of the meeting ‘Indigenous and local communities, business and biodiversity consultation’, 
held in New York on 12-13 May 2009 (13 May 2009), available at 
<www.equatorinitiative.org/images/stories/events/2009events/tribal_link_csd/ilcs_business_biodiversity_rep
ort_final_iv.pdf>. 
147
  The term ‘biotrade’ refers to the ‘collection, production, transformation, and commercialisation of goods and 
services derived from native biodiversity under the criteria of environmental, social and economic 
sustainability.’ See The BioTrade Initiative (Biotrade, undated) found at <www.biotrade.org/Intro/bti.htm>, 
which was referred to in Decision X/21, above n 142.  
148
  See BioTrade Principles and Criteria (Biotrade, undated), Principles 3-4 and 7, found at 
<www.biotrade.org/Intro/Principles/bti-principles.htm>.  
149
  Other initiatives can be found at : http://www.cbd.int/business/tools/. 
150
  Similarly to the case of the World Heritage Convention Secretariat discussed by N Affolder, ‘The Private 
Life of Environmental Treaties’ (2009) 103 American Journal of International Law 510. 
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Conclusions 
The trend towards corporate environmental accountability at the international level has 
intensified, as demonstrated by the 2011 review of the OECD Guidelines and IFC 
Performance Standards, the recent practice of the Global Compact’s integrity measures and 
the communications procedure initiated by the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights. Convergent international standards for corporate environmental 
accountability have also significantly impacted upon the international debate on corporate 
accountability and human rights – although the UN Framework for Business and Human 
Rights did not acknowledge it – by providing key tools such as impact assessment, 
stakeholder involvement and life-cycle management.  
 Overall, the resulting plurality of international avenues for addressing complaints 
against private companies not only supports those affected by corporate environmental 
damage, but may also protect the reputation of companies from unfounded allegations and 
contribute to the credibility of international standard-setting efforts. The risk of fragmented 
and possibly conflicting guidance to companies emerging from these international monitoring 
efforts appears for the great part averted by the significant convergence and increasing cross-
fertilization of international standards on corporate environmental accountability.
151
 
Specifically, concepts and guidelines elaborated under the CBD and adopted by consensus by 
its 193 state parties increasingly provide useful benchmarks to assess and guide corporate 
conduct towards environmental sustainability and the respect of relevant human rights. 
Accordingly, the 2011 review of the IFC Performance Standards, the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and the OECD Guidelines implementation procedure152 relied 
on the Akwé: Kon Guidelines and the concept of benefit-sharing developed under the CBD to 
complement and operationalise the UN Framework for Business and Human Rights. 
 
                                                 
151
 More systematic documentation of the operations and findings of international accountability mechanisms, 
however, would help in coherently developing international quasi-caselaw on corporate environmental 
accountability. In part, this was reflected in the 2011 review of the OECD Guidelines, where emphasis was 
placed on collecting and making publicly available information on recent trends among NCPs and the 
establishment of a database on specific instances: OECD Guidelines Update 2011 – Note by the Secretary-
General, above n 31, at 29. 
152
  Note that the CBD is the only MEA cited in the list of international instruments of reference on which 
implementation of the OECD Guidelines should rely, together with an unclear reference to ‘international 
treaties on persistent organic pollutants.’ The Secretary-General’s note stresses that ‘the number of 
instruments and initiatives that are relevant to the Guidelines far surpasses the possibility for introducing 
explicit references to them in the text of the Guidelines. For this reason, there is general agreement that, as 
part of follow-up on the updated Guidelines, a resource document [will] be compiled…’ (OECD Guidelines 
Update 2011 – Note by the Secretary-General, above n 31, at p. 6 and 9). 
